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Abstract
Human cooperation is a key driving force behind the evolutionary success of our hominin lineage. At the proximate level,
biologists and social scientists have identified other-regarding preferences – such as fairness based on egalitarian motives,
and altruism – as likely candidates for fostering large-scale cooperation. A critical question concerns the ontogenetic origins
of these constituents of cooperative behavior, as well as whether they emerge independently or in an interrelated fashion.
The answer to this question will shed light on the interdisciplinary debate regarding the significance of such preferences for
explaining how humans become such cooperative beings. We investigated 15-month-old infants’ sensitivity to fairness, and
their altruistic behavior, assessed via infants’ reactions to a third-party resource distribution task, and via a sharing task. Our
results challenge current models of the development of fairness and altruism in two ways. First, in contrast to past work
suggesting that fairness and altruism may not emerge until early to mid-childhood, 15-month-old infants are sensitive to
fairness and can engage in altruistic sharing. Second, infants’ degree of sensitivity to fairness as a third-party observer was
related to whether they shared toys altruistically or selfishly, indicating that moral evaluations and prosocial behavior are
heavily interconnected from early in development. Our results present the first evidence that the roots of a basic sense of
fairness and altruism can be found in infancy, and that these other-regarding preferences develop in a parallel and
interwoven fashion. These findings support arguments for an evolutionary basis – most likely in dialectical manner including
both biological and cultural mechanisms – of human egalitarianism given the rapidly developing nature of other-regarding
preferences and their role in the evolution of human-specific forms of cooperation. Future work of this kind will help
determine to what extent uniquely human sociality and morality depend on other-regarding preferences emerging early in
life.
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Introduction
Since Darwin, the evolutionary emergence and stability of
human cooperation – which presents an outlier in the animal
kingdom in terms of its scale – has puzzled biologists and social
scientists [1–3]. This is due to the paradoxical nature of
cooperative activities: they are frequently costly to the individual
without yielding any direct benefits. Traditionally, natural
selection is assumed to favor competition among conspecifics
[1,4], or, even more fundamentally, between alleles [3,5], but the
fact that virtually all human societies are based on cooperation
(often among genetically unrelated individuals) has led researchers
to identify mechanisms that allowed cooperation to emerge and
persist. Nowak [6] proposed five such mechanisms: kin selection,
direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity (based on reputation),
network reciprocity [7,8], and group selection. Further mecha-
nisms that have been suggested to enforce cooperation are
punishment including peer- and pool-punishment [9–15], reward
[16–18], and policing [19].
In addition to recognizing ultimate mechanisms that explain
why and under which conditions cooperative behaviors are
adaptive, a critical charge in building a scientific understanding
of human cooperative tendencies is identifying psychological
dispositions and traits that enable the operation of such
mechanisms in the first place. As such, empirical research using
psychological methods is very important for understanding how
humans become such cooperative beings over the course of
ontogeny. Recently, a range of prosocial dispositional attitudes or
‘‘other-regarding preferences’’ have been identified and promoted
as likely candidates to explain why human cooperation has been
maintained and developed to a large scale [20–23]. Among these
other-regarding preferences are fairness (based on egalitarian
motives, e.g., a propensity to share resources equally) and altruism
(an act costly to oneself and at the same time beneficial to a
recipient). Theoretically, these two constructs are interrelated:
both require a concern for others, and at times, a willingness or
ability to engage in personal sacrifice [22,24].
With respect to fairness, several studies in experimental
economics using bargaining games suggest that adults consider
fairness issues in their decision making [25,26], and that their
egalitarian motives even lead them to produce altruistic acts, such
as punishing cheaters (who do not contribute to a common pool)
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themselves [20,27]. Neuro-imaging work has confirmed this
preference for fairness and found that receiving fair (vs. unfair)
offers in bargaining games leads to greater activation in brain
reward regions [28], and that aversion to unfair offers is strongly
related to amygdala activity indicating an automatic emotional
response to unfairness [29]. Regarding altruism, other bargaining
games in which adults can choose how much, if any, money to give
to another subject (in a one-shot, anonymous setting) showed that
over 50% of participants decide to give away their own money and
thus perform an altruistic act [30]. These findings suggest that
such other-regarding preferences are an entrenched part of human
behavior. Yet debate exists as to whether other-regarding
preferences are also present in other species [31,32], or whether
they are uniquely human [22,33].
Past work indicates that other-regarding preferences may
emerge fairly late in ontogeny, suggesting the need for a protracted
period of socialization. For instance, when required to distribute
goods between themselves and a recipient, children do not
distribute goods equally until roughly middle childhood
[21,34,35]. Some studies [34] required children to act against
their self-interests to behave in a fair manner (e.g., by donating
stickers and thereby decreasing their own share of an endowment).
In another study [21] children played allocation games. In the
‘‘prosocial game’’, children received a candy, and were able to
choose whether their anonymous partner received zero candies or
one candy. Under these conditions, children younger than seven to
eight years of age did not reliably prefer the egalitarian allocation
(1:1). Given limitations in young children’s inhibitory control
abilities and in the ecological validity of these experiments (e.g.,
resource distribution devoid of social context), these paradigms,
however, may have underestimated young children’s abilities.
Indeed, evidence suggests that children as young as 3.5 years of
age distribute resources fairly when they do not stand to directly
benefit from the resource distribution [35,36]. These findings are
consistent with work suggesting that evaluating interactions
between other individuals along the dimension of fairness (third-
party fairness) is distinct from being the victim or agent (egocentric
fairness) of unfair behavior [37–39].
Similarly, experimental evidence suggests that sharing tenden-
cies also develop later in childhood. For example, a recent study
demonstrated that it is not until 25 months of age that toddlers
voluntarily share resources with an adult who makes her desire
explicit [40]. However, this experiment required children to
distribute essential resources and to act on complicated appara-
tuses requiring high attentional and motor demands, which may
have limited infants’ ability to share resources. Thus, it is possible
that infants will be more successful at sharing resources when
tested in paradigms that require less complex motoric responses,
and involve non-essential resources.
The current experiment investigated the emergence of sensitiv-
ity to fairness, and the willingness to share goods altruistically, in
15-month-old infants. Despite the work discussed above, there are
several reasons to believe that such other-regarding preferences
may emerge early in the course of development. At an
evolutionary level such preferences may have been crucial for
our hominin ancestors to enable and maintain cooperation in
small groups, and later, in larger groups of genetically unrelated
individuals, to introduce norms (e.g., how to share spoils after a
group hunt) that fostered group cohesion, and to motivate group
members to enforce those norms. At a developmental level, infants
often evaluate events on the basis of underlying social and physical
principles, before they can produce behavior consistent with these
principles [41–45]. Indeed, a recent study demonstrated that
infants may evaluate interactions between agents along morally
relevant dimensions [46]. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest
that prosocial behaviors, such as empathic concern [47–49] and
instrumental helping [31,50] can be detected via both naturalistic
observations, and in experimental tasks, during the second year of
life.
We investigated 15-month-old infants’ sensitivity to third-party
fairness using a resource distribution task in a violation-of-
expectation (VOE) paradigm, and infants’ explicit behavioral
responses in a sharing task, in which they could choose to share
resources with an unfamiliar adult altruistically (share a preferred
toy), selfishly (share a non-preferred toy), or not at all. By assessing
fairness and altruism in infants via both a violation-of-expectancy
paradigm and behavioral measures, we sought to empirically
validate the hypothesized theoretical interdependence between
these two constructs [22,24], and to understand the underlying
nature of infants’ potential fairness expectations.
Results
The study followed a within-subjects design with each infant
tested first in the VOE paradigm and subsequently in the sharing
task.
VOE Paradigm
In the VOE paradigm, infants watched two movies in which an
actor allocated continuous (milk) or discrete (crackers) resources to
two recipients in a 23-s distribution phase; the outcome of the
resource distribution was occluded by a black screen (see
Figures 1A–C). In the test phase of each movie, a still frame
depicted a fair (Figure 1D) and an unfair (Figure 1E) outcome in
succession (order counterbalanced; see Materials and Methods for
details), whereas the post-test phase showed the same displays
devoid of a social context (i.e., without actors), hence symmetrical
(Figure 1F) and asymmetrical (Figure 1G) outcomes in succession
(order counterbalanced). Critically, the distribution movement to
the recipient receiving more resources than the other recipient (in
the unfair test outcome) was 15% longer in duration than the
movement to the recipient receiving fewer resources. Thus, besides
a social evaluation of the scene (in terms of fairness issues) the
paradigm also allowed for a purely ‘‘physical evaluation’’ whose
expectations could be diametrically opposed to those of the social
one (e.g., an unfair outcome would not necessarily violate any
expectations if one solely focuses on the physical aspects of the
scene).
Since preliminary analyses yielded no effect of movie type
(crackers, milk) on infants’ looking to test and post-test outcomes,
the data were collapsed across movie type. All statistical tests were
performed two-tailed. Analyses focused on looking times collapsed
across both movies (n=28), or for one movie (n=19) for those
infants that only provided data for one movie, if not stated
otherwise. When applying more liberal inclusion criteria (no
minimum-look; see Methods for details), n=37 infants provide
looking times for both movies (and n=10 for one movie), and the
pattern of results (for both sets of analyses) remains the same.
Infants’ mean looking times to the test and post-test outcomes in
the VOE paradigm are depicted in Figure 2. Infants’ expectations
in the VOE paradigm were assessed by computing a repeated
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) on averaged looking
times with phase (test vs. post-test) and trial-type (fair/symmetrical
vs. unfair/asymmetrical outcome) as within-subjects factors. This
analysis yielded a significant main effect of phase, F(1, 46)=12.52,
p,.005, gp
2=.21, and a significant interaction of phase and trial-
type, F(1, 46)=4.68, p,.05, gp
2=.09. Planned comparisons
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(M=10.57 s, SD=6.48) versus the fair outcome (M=8.07 s,
SD=3.77) in the test phase, t(46)=2.50, p=.02, Cohen’s d=0.47
suggesting that these events violated infants’ expectations of third-
party fairness. In contrast, infants’ attention to the asymmetrical
(M=7.10 s, SD=4.03) and symmetrical (M=7.44 s, SD=5.96)
outcomes in the post-test phase did not differ, t(46)=-0.42, p=.68,
suggesting that infants had no baseline preference for asymmet-
rical outcomes over symmetrical outcomes.
Infants’ attention to the 23-s distribution phase during the first
(M=21.21 s, SD=1.43) and second movie (M=21.11 s,
SD=1.50), did not differ, t(27)=0.29, p=.77, ruling out the
possibility that a decline in attention over the course of the
experiment led to differential findings across the test and post-test
phases. Moreover, there was no difference in infants’ attention to
the last test trial (M=8.03 s, SD=4.76) and the first post-test trial
(M=7.78 s, SD=5.10), t(46)=0.44, p=.66, indicating that a
failure to find differences in looking to the symmetrical and
asymmetrical outcomes could not have arisen from lack of interest
in the post-test events.
Sharing Task and its Interrelations With the VOE
Paradigm
Two experimenters (one familiar and one unfamiliar) conducted
the sharing task. Two toys were placed on the wooden table 54 cm
apart (position counterbalanced). In the preference phase
(Figure 3A), infants chose one of the two toys (henceforth labeled
the preferred toy). Then, the familiar experimenter gave infants
the second (non-preferred) toy. In the request phase (Figure 3B), a
second, unfamiliar experimenter (who sat in front of the infant)
looked directly at the infant and asked her for a toy (alternating
between ‘‘Can I have one?’’ and ‘‘Can I have one, please?’’) every
five seconds for up to 25 seconds. Nine infants were excluded
because of a procedural error (n=1), technical error (n=2),
missing preference for one of the toys (n=2), or fussiness before/
during the preference phase (n=4). Twenty-six out of 38 infants
(68%) shared one of the toys: 12 infants shared the preferred toy
(32%; ‘‘altruistic sharers’’), 14 infants shared the non-preferred toy
(37%; ‘‘selfish sharers’’), and 12 infants did not respond at all
(32%; non-responders).
Regarding a potential relation between infants VOE perfor-
mance and their sharing status, it is important to note that if one
assumes that infants merely used a formula in the VOE paradigm
(e.g., a 15% time difference leads to a 15% difference ratio in
outcomes), we would expect no interrelation between infants’
VOE preference and their morally relevant sharing behavior,
since moral issues of fairness in the VOE paradigm would be
irrelevant. To examine the relation between infants’ sharing
behavior and their VOE performance, we performed two sets of
analyses. In the first analysis, we contrasted altruistic sharers and
selfish sharers/non-responders. This analysis assumes that infants
who shared the preferred toy were motivated by altruistic
concerns, whereas those who shared the non-preferred toy, or
did not respond at all, were motivated by selfish concerns. Ninety-
two percent of altruistic sharers looked longer to the unfair
outcome (paired sign test, p=.006), whereas 62% of the group of
Figure 1. Schematic of the VOE paradigm. In the introductory
phase of the crackers movie (milk movie), the distributor greeted the
recipients, lifted the bowl of 4 crackers (the pitcher with 10 ounces of
milk) while saying ‘‘Yummy!’’ (A). Then, the recipients moved their
plates (glasses) toward the distributor asking ‘‘Please?’’. During the
distribution phase (B), the distributor then allocated crackers (milk;
exact amount occluded by a black screen) to each recipient via a single
movement to each side. The distributor then held up the empty bowl
(pitcher) up saying ‘‘All gone!’’ (C). During the test phase, a still frame
depicted a fair (D; crackers: 2 crackers each; milk: 5 oz each) and an
unfair (E; crackers: 3 crackers vs. 1 cracker; milk: 8 vs. 2 oz) outcome in
succession (order counterbalanced), with the actors displaying neutral
facial expressions, whereas the post-test phase showed the same
displays devoid of a social context, hence symmetrical (F) and
asymmetrical (G) outcomes in succession (order counterbalanced).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023223.g001
Figure 2. Mean looking times (s) of infants to test and post-test
trials collapsed across movie type.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023223.g002
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outcome (paired sign test, p=.33; Fisher’s exact test, p=.004; see
Table 1). This association between infants’ sharing status and test
preference did not arise due to group differences in preferences for
symmetrical versus asymmetrical outcomes (Fisher’s exact test,
p=.49): neither altruistic (p=.77) nor selfish sharers/non-respond-
ers (p=.56) differed in their looking to the post-test outcomes.
Hence, this tight association between the two tasks validates the
VOE paradigm by revealing a relation between variability in
third-party social evaluation and ‘‘first-party morality’’ (altruistic
vs. selfish sharing), leading to a meaningful dichotomy: altruistic
sharers paid attention to fairness issues in the VOE paradigm,
whereas selfish sharers/non-responders as a group were not
concerned with moral aspects of the VOE scene. Furthermore,
these results strongly suggest that the interrelation between the two
tasks is based on other-regard, and support the argument that
infants were not merely paying more attention to the unfair
outcomes because of asymmetry (vs. symmetry in fair outcomes),
as this assumption would lead to the theoretically implausible
conclusion that altruistic sharers prefer asymmetry, and selfish
sharers/non-responders do not.
The above analysis assumes that both selfish sharers and non-
responders were motivated by the same factor: a reluctance to
share the preferred toy. However, it is alternately possible that
non-responders were comprised of a heterogeneous group whose
performance on the sharing task was governed by factors ancillary
to selfish or altruistic concerns. Indeed, there are multiple reasons
that infants may fail to respond in our task: because they do not
understand the experimenter’s request, because they are distracted
or inattentive, because they are struggling to decide which toy to
select under the allotted time constraints, and/or because they
suffer from stranger anxiety.
To investigate whether non-responders differed from responders
(i.e., altruistic and selfish sharers) on at least one of the dimensions
listed above, we coded all infants for behaviors indicative of
stranger anxiety [51–53] during the request phase of the sharing
task. This dimension was selected for two reasons. First, stranger
anxiety is a normal affective response or a form of distress that the
majority of infants show during their ontogeny that is orthogonal
to moral concerns or motivations [51,53], and that peaks between
12 to 15 months [51,54]. Second, stranger anxiety results in a
range of identifiable behaviors that could be readily and
objectively coded from videotape (concerned/fearful facial expres-
sions, avoiding looking at the requestor, crying, looks to the parent;
[51–53]). Two non-responding infants could not be offline coded
due to technical error; the results would remain the same were
these two infants included in the analysis. A Mann-Whitney U test
on sum stranger anxiety scores (0–4) revealed that non-responders
showed more stranger anxiety (Mdn=1.0) than responders
(Mdn=0), U=38, p,.001. Individual-level analyses (based on
262 contingency tables) confirmed this pattern: Seventy percent of
non-responders avoided looking at the requestor at least once,
versus only 12% of responders (Fisher’s exact test, p=.001), and
40% of non-responders (vs. 0% of responders) showed concerned/
fearful facial expressions (p=.004). These findings strongly support
the claim that non-responders should be treated as a separate
group, as their behavior on the sharing task may be governed by
stranger anxiety independent of either selfish or altruistic concerns.
Indeed, the non-responders had no preference for either outcome
in the VOE paradigm (67% preferred the unfair outcome, 33%
the fair outcome; paired sign test, p=.39).
Thus, in our second analysis we directly contrasted altruistic
sharers’ with selfish sharers’ VOE performance. We found a
Figure 3. Schematic of the sharing task. In the preference phase
(A), the infant chose one of the two toys (only one reachable at a time) -
her preferred toy. After the infant had taken one toy, the familiar
experimenter gave the infant the other (non-preferred) toy (not
depicted here). In the request phase (B), an unfamiliar experimenter
asked for a toy while looking directly at the infant. Here, the infant
shares her preferred toy (‘‘altruistic sharing’’).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023223.g003
Table 1. Contingency table showing the relation between
infants’ VOE preference and their sharing status.
VOE preference
Unfair Fair Total
Sharing status Altruistic 11 1 12
Selfish/no
response
10 16 26
Total 21 17 38
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023223.t001
Table 2. Contingency table showing the altruistic and selfish
sharers’ VOE preference.
VOE preference
Unfair Fair Total
Sharing status Altruistic 11 1 12
Selfish 2 12 14
Total 13 13 26
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023223.t002
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mance (Table 2; Fisher’s exact test, p,.001), and that 86% of
selfish sharers looked longer to the fair outcome (paired sign test,
p=.013). Again, this association was not due to group differences
in preferences for symmetrical versus asymmetrical outcomes
(Fisher’s exact test, p=.23), and the selfish sharers had no
preference for either post-test outcome (p=.18). This finding
suggests that infants’ morally relevant own behavior (altruistic vs.
selfish) is tightly linked to their third-party evaluation of morally
relevant situations: altruists pay attention to normative (moral)
issues of fairness, whereas selfish infants are interested in non-
moral physical aspects of social interactions.
Discussion
The current study provides the first evidence that by at least 15
months of age, human infants possess the rudiments of a sense of
fairness in that they expect resources to be allocated equally when
observing others (third-party fairness). Furthermore, our findings
suggest that sharing non-essential resources (at high or low personal
costs) with an unfamiliar adult is also prevalent at this age, which
dovetails with natural observations of sharing behavior with familiar
adults in young infants [55]. More specifically, even altruistic
sharing exists in 15-month-olds: one third of infants shared the toy
they preferred despite having the option to share a non-preferred
toy (or to not respond at all); and virtually all of these ‘‘altruistic
sharers’’ expected third-party fairness when observing a resource
allocation situation in our VOE paradigm. Infants who shared a
non-preferred toy (‘‘selfish sharers’’), however, did not focus on
(moral) issues of fairness: they appeared more concerned with
whether the test outcomes in the VOE paradigm conformed to the
physical parameters of the display, which means that they looked
longer at fair outcomes, presumably because these did not
correspond to the ‘‘physics’’ of the distribution phase. Critically,
the aforementioned findings hold when controlling for fair
allocation-inherent perceptual features and cues, such as symmet-
rical (i.e., equal amounts of resources in two locations) versus
asymmetrical displays, and also without controlling for individual
differences in sharing behavior (selfish sharers were included in the
analyses of the VOE paradigm, and infants, as a group, still showed
the effect). Moreover, the interrelation between the two tasks
provides supplemental evidence that it is not asymmetry versus
symmetry that drives infants’ looking behavior.
Were infants merely responding to the test events as violations
of non-moral conventions (e.g., that goods are usually divided into
equal amounts), there would be no reason to expect a tight
interconnection between infants’ evaluations of the test events and
their prosocial behavior. Thus, we suggest that infants evaluate
events along morally relevant dimensions, and not just according
to whether such events are consistent or inconsistent with
conventional norms. Moreover, the fact that infants’ sensitivity
to fairness and altruism were interrelated not only lends support to
theoretical claims of a close alliance in other-regarding preferences
[22,24], but also suggests that morally relevant evaluations, and
behavior of a moral character, develop in a parallel and
interwoven fashion. Critically, our findings suggest that the
individual differences in fairness sensitivity and altruistic behavior
that have been documented in adulthood [37,38] can be traced
back to infancy, suggesting that such individual differences might
have deep ontogenetic roots.
Taken together, the present findings strike a new path in social-
moral development, because they suggest that in addition to
instrumental helping [31,50], and empathetic concern to others’
distress [47–49], constituents of fairness understanding and
altruistic behavior emerge during the second year of life.
Furthermore, this study suggests that besides a general propensity
to show concern for others’ well-being early in life, egalitarian
motives also seem to emerge early in ontogeny, a finding that
complements and informs current research emphasizing strong
egalitarian motives in adults [20,27]. Hence, these early emerging
other-regarding preferences might be conducive to explaining the
evolutionary success of our hominin lineage, since they are
considered to be important contributors to cooperation [21–23].
Given the early developing nature of such sensitivity and its
theoretical relation to the evolution of human-specific forms of
cooperation, these findings support the claim that other-regarding
preferences have been adaptive in our ancestral small-scale group
environments and therefore been transmitted up to the present,
most likely via both biological and cultural mechanisms.
With respect to the evolution of cooperation, one mechanism,
indirect reciprocity [6], has been suggested to be intimately linked
to the evolution of human morality and social norms [56–58]. In
this vein, our findings may provide an empirical piece of the puzzle
of human cooperation, given that early in ontogeny, rudiments of
behaviors and skills that may be related to the ultimate mechanism
of indirect reciprocity are present. Future work will help elucidate
how early moral and prosocial capacities like fairness and altruism
interrelate with other skills and behaviors considered important for
human cooperation, such as understanding and applying (non-
moral) social norms.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
The treatment of participants in this paper was in accordance
with the ethical standards of the American Psychological
Association. The subjects’ parents provided written informed
consent, and the study was approved by the Institutional Review
Board at the University of Washington, Seattle, WA (Application
#24231).
Participants
Forty-seven healthy full-term 15-month-old infants (M=15
months, 8 days, range =14 months, 20 days – 15 months, 28 days;
24 girls) participated in the study, recruited from urban and
surrounding areas of a mid-size city in the USA. Fifteen additional
infants were excluded from the study due to fussiness (n=5),
parental interference (n=2), failure to meet the minimum-look
criteria for inclusion (n=7; see below), or experimenter error
(n=1). Parents provided written informed consent. Each infant
received a small present for their participation in the study.
Apparatus and Materials
VOE Paradigm. Movies were recorded with three female
actors (a distributor and two recipients), and presented on a 21-
inch television monitor. The props used in the movies were four
Graham crackers, white plates, a transparent bowl (crackers
movie), and milk, transparent glasses (volume of 10 oz.), and a
transparent glass pitcher (milk movie), respectively.
Sharing Task. A green Lego brick (4 cm width, 7 cm length)
and a female doctor toy (4 cm width, 8 cm height) were used as
resources, and a wooden table (38692 cm) served as the location
from which infants could choose one toy.
Stimuli and Procedure
VOE Paradigm. Infants sat on their parent’s lap (80 cm from
the display). Parents were instructed to remain silent, and to close
their eyes during the experiment. The movies consisted of an
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attention), a familiarization phase (including an introductory phase
and a 23-s distribution phase), two test trials (a fair and unfair
outcome), and two post-test trials (a symmetrical and asymmetrical
outcome). Movie order, test outcome shown first, first distribution
side, and location (right, left) of the unfair/asymmetrical outcome
were counterbalanced across infants.
Sharing task. The procedure of the sharing task is outlined
in the Results section.
Coding and Reliability
All sessions were coded on-line, recorded and additionally
coded from videotape by a second independent observer.
VOE Paradigm. The minimum-look criterion (accumulated)
to the distribution phase was 18.4 s (80% of 23 s). Infants’ looking
to the test and post-test trials was timed on-line until they looked
away for 1 consecutive second (maximum trial length: 30 s;
minimum-look criterion: 2 s). The second independent observer
coded all subjects for reliability (interobserver agreement: 95%).
Sharing Task. The secondary observer coded which toy
infants chose, whether infants shared a toy or not, which toy
(preferred vs. non-preferred) infants handed the second unfamiliar
experimenter (interobserver agreement: 100%). The secondary
observer additionally coded subjects for behaviors indicative of
stranger anxiety in the request phase (concerned/fearful facial
expressions, avoiding looking at the requestor, crying, looks to the
parent; interobserver agreement: 94%).
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